Solving humanitarian problems and stabilizing the area around the line of contact is the bare minimum outcome of talks on Ukraine that all sides consider necessary. At the same time, each side suspects that for its opponents, this minimum is also the maximum in terms of what is politically acceptable.

Russia needs Belarus and Lukashenko to serve as an alluring example to other post-Soviet rulers of how beneficial integration with Russia can be. As long as Moscow has the ambition of preserving its influence over the post-Soviet states, any Russian leader will need Lukashenko as a showcase ally.

The Power of Siberia pipeline is a long overdue step in the right direction in developing the strategic relationship with China in the gas sector. Yet plenty of questions remain about the implementation of future pipeline projects.

Macron is right about the need to see relations with Russia in the context of a changing international system. At the same time, there must be a sober assessment of what is and is not possible between the EU and Russia.

Beijing perceives the U.S. withdrawal from the INF and possible deployment of ground-based missiles to Asia as part of Washington’s broader campaign to contain China. Overall, China can be fairly confident regarding its chances in a potential missile race in Asia, thanks to several advantages.

Multilateralism should not be conceived as necessarily cooperative: one set of multilateral institutions can be used to challenge another set.

The ruling party will clearly retain its central place under any future scenario for the transition of power, and anyone who hurries to jump on the bandwagon today will likely come out on top.

The pro-Russia Party of Socialists of the Republic of Moldova has managed to accumulate an impressive amount of institutional power. But this concentration of power brings not only advantages, but also greater vulnerabilities, especially when there are plenty of destabilizing factors at work, from uncertain gas supplies to mass voting by residents of the breakaway region Transnistria.

This podcast focuses on Russian trade since 2014, when the country started to turn away from the West and increase its exposure to China. Podcast host Alex Gabuev is joined by Tatiana Flegontova and Janis Kluge.

The Russian authorities’ attempts to improve conditions for entrepreneurs are not very predictable, and the new investment regime is constructed in such a way that state control over investment projects will grow, while most state support will go to state capitalists and companies close to them.

Zelensky’s economic path has turned out to be as contradictory as his political path. Various promises ranging from libertarian reforms to classic social populism are hindering the implementation of any meaningful policy.

Russia’s suggestion that Belarus resurrect a 1999 agreement to get compensation for Russia’s oil tax maneuver looks fairly cynical to Minsk. After all, by joining the EEU, in which single markets—including for energy commodities—are supposed to be created between 2018 and 2024, Belarus has already paid for all of its tariff preferences.

At a time when demand for diversified foreign policy in the South Caucasus is clear, Beijing is building political frameworks that are attractive to countries in the region. In addition, China’s reluctance to get involved in the region’s internal problems makes it a convenient partner for everyone.

Amid the uncertainty over what will happen when Putin steps down in 2024, everyone is striving to claim exclusive functions that could later be required by Putin during the implementation of his plan for the transition of power.

The political framework for cooperation was agreed at the Russia-Africa summit, and with heads of state in attendance and a declaration signed, it was undoubtedly a success for Russia’s Foreign Ministry. As for an institutional economic framework for what is being billed as “Russia’s return to Africa,” it’s still early days.

China has always been considered a convenient partner for Central Asian countries, because it asked for virtually nothing in exchange for investment. But unlike with Western countries, which state the terms of cooperation in advance, with China there are unspoken rules, including a taboo on acknowledging any problems in the relationship.

As long as Serbia lacks a solution to the Kosovo dispute that it can sell both to its international partners and to people at home, and as long as Serbia is denied a clear path to EU integration, it will continue to keep the Russia card up its sleeve.

Russia can’t compete with China in terms of their influence in Africa, so Moscow’s attempts to make inroads there do not alarm Beijing. But as China asserts itself in the role of the major power in Africa, Moscow’s dual influence (such as selling weapons to different sides of a conflict in the same country) could become an impediment to stabilization.

Only the continuation of nuclear arms control can create the political and military conditions for eventual limitations of innovative weapons systems and technologies, as well as for a carefully thought through and phased shift to a multilateral format of nuclear disarmament.

The replacement of Russia’s Human Rights Council head Mikhail Fedotov, who was completely loyal to the authorities, with United Russia party member Valery Fadeyev, determines the council’s status once and for all. It is first and foremost a presidential council, and only then a human rights council.