The Kremlin has consistently failed to define its vision of Russia’s future. But what about the Russian public?
For the Baltic states, a good Russia policy is one that creates distance between them and their neighbor to the east while maintaining some ties with it. Yet the few areas of cooperation that remain could easily become casualties of political battles.
China’s commitment to full carbon neutrality by 2060 means that the country needs to reduce the consumption of all fossil fuels, including natural gas. What does that mean for Russia and Central Asia?
Major Chinese tech companies are actively expanding their presence on the Russian market. They may not have the state support that state-owned development banks or energy giants do, but that isn’t stopping them from successfully incorporating Russia into a digital Pax Sinica.
Frustrated maximalism may present a window for rapprochement. The Baltic states will be more likely to look at Russia as it is, not as they want it to be. One day Russia might also look at the Baltic states as just neighbors: not as an amputated part of the Soviet Union, or Washington’s hostile lapdog.
Russia and its Baltic Sea neighbors could start repairing their badly broken relationship on a common basis of neighborliness. This would fall far short of partnership, but it would end unchecked hostility.
For all the talk of Beijing’s growing presence in the former Soviet Union, the fruits of Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova’s efforts to deepen cooperation with China have been underwhelming
This podcast episode focuses on the shift in power in Central Asia and the evolving roles of China and Russia there.
Biden’s task in the Middle East is to reduce U.S. involvement without allowing Russia to take advantage of the resulting vacuum.
Danish Ambassador Per Carlsen was recently commissioned by Dmitri Trenin, head of the Carnegie Moscow Center, to provide his view on the developments in the Baltic Sea region in a blog format. Tragically, Per Carlsen passed away a day after he finalized this blog post.
The impending reappraisal of U.S. policy on the Middle East can’t definitively be described as good or bad for Russia. In some respects, it will create hurdles for Moscow, but new opportunities may also arise.
Embroiled in a confrontation with the West, Russia cannot play the role of an effective intermediary, and Moscow’s unwillingness to subsidize North Korea means that for Pyongyang, Russia is of no interest as a potential donor.
The current U.S.-Russian confrontation is a state of relations one step removed from war. Engaging in consultations aimed at developing some basic rules of the road in cyberspace makes eminent sense.
Despite many years of talk of the Far East’s economic dependence on Chinese capital and labor, the pandemic has revealed that both of those resources can be found in Russia itself.
The Baltic countries and Russia need to talk to each other. A lack of communication could cause incidents to escalate and lead to a military confrontation. For this reason, dialogue on military risk reduction with Russia and Belarus is crucial.
Russia’s association with Lukashenko’s crackdown may persuade Belarusians that it is impossible to be a pro-Russian democrat: that one can only be one or the other. Support for authoritarianism is going out of fashion in Belarus; pro-Russianness may, too.
Alex Gabuev and Marietje Schaake discuss the governance of the digital domain in the coronavirus era.
This is not a call for a reset or a new partnership, but rather for a responsible, less hostile relationship between rivals bitterly divided by visions of world order, geopolitical interests, and values.
Faced with a pandemic, growing inequality, and widespread dissatisfaction, the Kremlin has launched a series of measures aimed at consolidating Russia’s authoritarian political system. Will they work?
If Russia and China study each other’s legislation, it’s purely out of practical considerations for the purposes of doing business and protecting the interests of their own nationals.