This is a legacy website featuring a collection of work by the Carnegie Endowment’s global network of scholars on topics including Russia, Ukraine, Eurasia, and the post-Soviet states. This site is a product of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace based in Washington, D.C. For more recent work by Carnegie scholars in this field, please visit Carnegie Politika.
It is in both Moscow and Washington’s interests to find realistic ways to improve bilateral strategic relations.
Russia has entered a new period in its political history and protests are likely to continue long after the election results are in.
The problem with Putin’s vision for modernizing Russia’s military is that it rests on the misplaced belief that the United States is still the country’s principal adversary.
Vladimir Putin cannot survive a sustained, nonviolent protest movement unless he creates a regime change by changing himself and addressing corporate influence on politics.
Russia has been in a post-empire state for the last 20 years. There is no way back to an empire now—Russia has passed the point of no return in this respect.
As a permanent member of the UN Security Council and a nuclear power, Russia has substantial leverage in the post-Soviet space and is the EU's most important neighbor. However, in the coming decades Russia will face serious internal and international challenges.
While Russia will not help push Syrian President Bashar al-Assad out, it must be careful about the consequences of a dispute with multiple countries over Syria. However, the West, too, needs to be careful not to antagonize Russia on this issue.
If Russia continues to support Syrian leader Bashar al-Assad, it does not bode well for cooperation between Russia and the West on missile defense or any other security matter of a strategic nature.
Moscow’s position on Syria is primarily shaped by the recent experience of Libya, strong doubts concerning the Syrian opposition, and suspicions about U.S. motives.
The core issue in the NATO-Russia relationship is the mutual deficit of trust. The Euro-Atlantic area needs a “security community,” where no member expects any other state to use force or threaten to use force against it.