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    • Carnegie.ru Commentary

    Why Putin Is Losing Popular Support

    The approval ratings of Russia’s leaders and its institutions have been declining for more than three years. The erosion of popular support has been accelerated, rather than caused, by the unveiling of the government’s pension reform plan, and Russians are increasingly concerned by the state of not only their pensions but also their country’s foreign policy and its economy

    • Op-Ed

    Saving Colonel Putin: Why Russia’s Pension Reform Just Got More Expensive

    Putin’s formula for pension reform might allow him to stem his political losses. Even if his ratings don’t grow, they might at least stop falling. But the cost of saving Colonel Putin will turn out to be exorbitantly high for the budget and the economy.

    • Carnegie.ru Commentary

    Russia’s Empty Throne: Why Putin Manufactures Political Uncertainty

    The less specific presidential orders are, the greater the speculation about what Putin actually wants done. This deliberate vagueness allows the president to see more clearly both the new power balance and the political material he will have to deal with in the next six years.

    • Op-Ed

    Why Putin’s Approval Ratings Are Declining Sharply

    Putin’s successful foreign policy agenda is starting to lose its power to command public support in the face of growing domestic frustrations.

    • Carnegie.ru Commentary

    Why Russia Can’t Build the Political Infrastructure It Needs

    Public discontent over a plan to raise Russia’s pension age has revealed a critical flaw in the country’s political system: there is no political infrastructure that can function in crisis conditions. Only President Vladimir Putin can speak on behalf of the state. Without him, the vertical collapses. Russia desperately needs alternative connections between the state and the people. But virtually any political infrastructure project fundamentally undermines the country’s power vertical.

    • Carnegie.ru Commentary

    Illusory Stability: Putin’s Regime Is Readier Than Ever for Change

    The events of the last four years in Russia show that its fabled stability and lack of change have stopped being the top political value. Today, the Russian regime is more ready than ever for transformation. Before, any decisions had to be approved by the president and were made at a snail’s pace because Putin had no time. Now, it’s the other way around: decisions are made quickly precisely because Putin has no time.

    • Carnegie.ru Commentary

    Putin and Yumashev: Survivors of the Nineties

    Vladimir Putin learned the art of political survival in the Kremlin of the 1990s. Little wonder that he has decided to keep on his former co-conspirator from that era, Valentin Yumashev.

    • Op-Ed

    For Putin, Sport Is a State Affair

    The tradition of sport acting as a kind of hybrid war has seamlessly continued in Russia into the post-Soviet period. It is victory at any cost, because victory has political significance. It’s soft power, the face of the country, the image of an invincible nation ruled by a wise leader.

    • Carnegie.ru Commentary

    Expect No Changes From Russia’s New Presidential Administration

    To predict what the Kremlin will do, we need look no further than the ambitious but unrealized initiatives of the mid-2000s, such as enlarging the regions and tax reforms. The same is true of the Kremlin’s staffing policy: even if there are some reshuffles, the positions of power go to experienced and well-known individuals. Vladimir Putin is comfortable talking to familiar people on familiar subjects. His closest associates are well aware of this fact and have adjusted to their boss’s preferences.

    • Carnegie.ru Commentary

    Bullying the Big Cities: The Kremlin’s New Approach

    The regional unification of record-high presidential election results has closed the Kremlin bureaucrats’ eyes to the diversity of different parts of the country, their elites, and the preferences of their electorates. In this model, regional masters of balance and public politics are extraneous. But the expulsion of old regional barons is risky: the banner of public pushback and local patriotism could be picked up by new regional politicians who might be even less convenient for Moscow.

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